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NOTES AND COMMENT

Where there is a second adoption the question arises whether the
child inherits from both the first and second adopting parents. In re
Klapps Estates' the court decides that although an adopted child may
inherit from both his natural and adoptive parents, in case of a second
adoption, the first adoption is ipso facto revoked and the child- loses
the right to inherit from the first adoptive parents. The later Kansas
case of Dreyer v. Schricht,6 takes an opposite view and says of the
holding in the former case: "The law creates the capacity to inherit
and not birth or adoption. The law invests those born and those
adopted with that capacity without distinction. Some other law must
be found which destroys the capacity in one case and not in the other,
or it persists without regard to whether it originated with birth or
adoption."
In case In re Darling7 is contrary to all those discussed above in that
it holds that an adopted child cannot recover as the heir of his natural
father. It does hold, however, that such a child can recover as the
heir of his grandfather (father of his natural father).
Wisconsin has no leading cases on the subject. Section 4024 of
the Statutes" which defines the rights of the adopting parents and the
adopted child definitely provides that a child who is adopted, becomes
capable of inheriting from his adoptive parents. He is not, however,
made capable of taking property expressly limited to the "heirs of
the body" of such parents. In no place does this statute deprive the
child of the right to inherit from his natural parent.
R. F. RocHE.
Attorney and Client: "Ambulance Chasing" is a violation of profession.-In the recent case of Chunes v. Duluth R. R. (Minn. 1924.)
298 Fed. 964.-we have the following interesting case presented.
On March 20, 1923, Messrs. Dahl & McDonald, attorneys at law,
commenced an action based on personal injuries in the state court of
Dakota County, Minnesota. The case was removed to the federal
court on diversity of citizenship.
On March 26, 1923, a second action on the same cause was instituted
by them in the state district court of Wright County, Minnesota.
This case was also removed to the federal court for diversity of
citizenship.
On March 29, 1923, a third suit was started on the came cause, in
the name of the plaintiff, in the state court of St. Louis County by
Messrs. Barton & Kumuchey, attorneys at law, which was also removed
to the federal court for the same reasons as the others.
164 N. W. 381.
a io5 Kansas 495, 185 Pac. 30.
' 173 Cal. 221, I59 Pac. 6o6.
'Sec. 4024, Wis. Stat. A child so adopted shall be deemed, for the purposes
of inheritancd and succession by such child, custody of the person and right to
obedience by such parents by adoption, and all other legal consequences and incidents of the natural relation of parents and children the same to all intents and
purposes the same as if the child had been borne in lawful wedlock of such
parents by adoption, excepting that such child shall not be capable of taking
property expressly limited to the heirs of the body of such parents, etc.
6 197 Mich. 6,5,
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There were then three suits based on the same cause of action,
seeking the same relief, pending at the same time. Both firms of
attorneys claimed authority from the plaintiff to represent him. On
motion of the defendant to require the two firms mentioned to show
by what authority they appeared in the action, there was presented
to the court in substance, the following contradictory affidavits:
i. That Dahl & McDonald were retained by the plaintiff. Later
Kamuchey called to see the plaintiff at the hospital where he was ill.
After the interview Dahl & McDonald were dismissed but the plaintiff,
in a later meeting with McDonald, expressed his willingness for DahI
& McDonald to proceed with the case and agreed to dismiss Kamuchey.
To meet and controvert this affidavit of McDonald's, Kamuchey
submitted an affidavit purporting to have been subscribed and sworn
by the plaintiff.
2. That the plaintiff in the case was a track laborer and was injured while in the employ of the defendant. A few days later, two
men came to see him in the hospital where he had been taken, asking
about the facts of the case, which one man wrote down. He then signed
a paper, so held that a large portion of it was covered, purporting
to be a statement of facts relative to the injuries. The men left
cards with the name of Dahl & McDonald thereon. Three days later
one of them came bringing fruit and candy, and during the conversation at the time the plaintiff learned that that the paper he had signed
was a contract employing Dahl & McDonald as lawyers to handle the
case. The plaintiff asked for the return of the paper and requested
that the firm do nothing about the case. Later, the plaintiff sent a
letter to the attorneys withdrawing the case from them.
3. A later affidavit alleged that Barton & Kamuchey were retained.
4. In rebuttal was submitted an affidavit from McDonald denying
the gaining of the contract through fraud and alleging that the letter
of dismissal was sent at the instigation of Kamuchey as were the
plaintiff's affidavits above. The reason why the plaintiff was loath
to dismiss Kamuchey was that certain of the witnesses were friends
of Kamuchey and would not testify if he did not handle the case.
Each firm entered affidavits of other individuals upholding their
respective claims. On the hearing of the motion of the defendant the
two firms of attorneys competing for the plaintiff's case made mutual
charges of "ambulance chasing."
HELD: That the court being unable to find from the welter of
contradictory affidavits that either firm had authority to commence the
actions, they were dismissed.
If the first affidavit of McDonald's was true, then his firm had
authority to bring suit.
If the affidavits of the plaintiff were true, the authority was obtained by fraud and deceit and McDonald committed perjury in making
his affidavit.
If the second McDonald affidavit was true, the plaintiff committed
perjury in making his affidavit and the attorneys who induced him to
make them are guilty of subornation or perjury.
In dismissing the actions the presiding judge was extraordinarily dis-
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passionate when he said, "It is very difficult to deal temperately with
the situation disclosed by the foregoing affidavits."
The following extracts from Savarin v. Union Pac. R. R., 292 Fed.
Rep. (Minn.) 157, I6I, 162, depicts the present situation in Minnesota
as to the practice of bringing numerous suits on the same cause of action
in the various counties of the state. "It is a matter of common knowledge that this practice is growing in Minnesota, and seems to be confined to attorneys who specialize in personal injury litigation, and largely
to cases imported into Minnesota from foreign states. The object and
purpose of the practice seems to be to ascertain the counties in which
juries are most liberal in fixing damages in the class of cases mentioned.
While in the present case only two cases have been commenced on the
same cause of action, in other instances it is understood that as high as
four or five cases have been commenced in as many different counties;
the summons and complaint being identical in all of them. This practice
requires defendants to retain counsel and to appear and answer in each
case, and if they are removable cases, to effect a removal of the same to
this court, thus unreasonably increasing the work in the clerk's office
and further congesting calendars already badly congested.
"The two cases now before the court aptly illustrate the effect of this
practice on the litigants and the court alike; that is, instead of one there
are two cases, two removal proceedings, two motions to remand, and two
motions to vacate the service of the summons. In other words, there is
an increase of ioo per cent in the expense of the litigation to the defendants, and in the work of the clerks of both courts and of the court
itself. It is a caurse of conduct that cannot be justified. It is at war
with generally accepted ideas of professional conduct, ethics and
decency. The judges of this court have had this matter under consideration and are in agreement on the proposition that the practice
mentioned is a gross abuse of the process and machinery of both the
national and state courts, and, if further pursued, this court will feel
called upon to resort to disciplinary methods sufficient in severity to
effectually put an end to the practice."
In the principal case the presiding judge being unable to decide by
what right either firm of attorneys appeared in the actions, the only
choice left him was to throw the cases out of court. As established by
Rosenthal v. Fornan, 115 N. Y. S. 282, the plaintiff is not prejudiced.
The opinion in the principal case reads, "The situation described in
the affidavits is one calculated to make any one with a love for the legal
profession blush with shame, and apparently is the natural resultant and
product of the very demoralizing practice which has grown up in the
legal profession in the large cities, and which has done so much to debase and degrade the honorable profession of the law." One but has to
search the Digests to realize that the growth of the so-called "ambulance
chasing" element of the profession seems to have arisen and kept pace
with industrialism. The nearer one approaches to cases of present date,
the more frequently the opprobrious term appears.
A great amount of righteous indignation is heard on all sides and the
clamor increases with the cases, but as yet, no case has come to hand
based solely upon "ambulance chasing" by the attorney himself, in which
discipline of any weight has been meted out. There are cases where
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this trade has been combined with other more serious offenses. In re
Newall, i6o N. Y. S. 275, is such a case. Here the attorneys had a system of "runners" to search out victims of railway accidents, the added
offense being that of cheating clients so obtained of all that was justly
due them. The cases show an increasing stringency concerning those
who violate the ethics of the profession which may be attributed to the
growing strength and consciousness of the bar associations throughout
the country.'
The Cannons of Professional Ethics of the various bar associations
have sections devoted to this matter. Appended to many of them is the
following portion from a law lecture delivered by Lincoln: "Never stir
up litigation. A worse man can scarcely be found than one who does
this. Who can be more nearly a fiend than he who habitually overhauls
the register of deeds in search of defects in titles, whereon to stir up
strife and put money in his pocket? A moral tone ought to be infused
into the profession which would drive such men out of it." Nicolay and
Hay's Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. ii,

page 142.

The register

worms of Lincoln's day have extended the field of their activities. If
Lincoln's admonition was applicable in that period of the profession
called the "Golden Era," it is doubly true today, for now they overhaul
the street, hospitals and homes.
Warvelle, in his Essays in Legal Ethics, pages 56-57, stigmatizes
"ambulance chasing" as a "vile prostitution of the advocate's calling.
It is not law practice; it is simply a form of legalized piracy."
Few attorneys are so endowed with wealth that they can give their
services gratis. Recognizing this a New York court.observed, "The
standard should be raised, rather than lowered, for the age in which we
live is one which is much concerned with money and the things money
will bring. The fact that the lawyer must support himself by his professional labors, and that he receives his compensation from a purely
private source, unquestionably has a tendency to commercialize his work
and obscure even from his own mind the fact that his real client is
Justice," In re Newall, 16o N. Y. S. 275, 278.

V. W. D.
Attorney and Client: Kfnowledge of first attorney imputed to
client.-The rule of law that knowledge of an attorney is knowledge
of his client was given a rather rigid application in the recent case of
Farnsworth, v. Hazelett (Iowa, 1924) i99 N. W. 41o.

The client in

this case procured the service of the attorney for the purpose of collecting a debt. The attorney made arrangements with a bank whereby the
debtor was to make full payment. Before he had communicated such
knowledge to his client, the client learned that the debtor contemplated
a disposal of some of his property. He immediately "hot-footed" over
to the attorney's home. On arriving there he was informed that the
attorney was seriously ill and in no position to see or talk to anyone.
In his anxiety he immediately consulted another attorney and insisted
that a suit be brought at once. At the trial of the case the defendant put
in a counter-claim for malicious prosecution and recovered judgment.
1

See Note and Comment in next issue of the Review on Hepp v. Petrie, 200

N. W. 857 (Wis.).

